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on reservations are generally not subject to state law. 6 Moreover, the Court's decisions in this time period resolved basic questions that had been undetermined in the first two centuries of the Republic -such as whether Indian tribes can punish non-Indians who commit crimes on Indian lands, 7 whether tribes can tax non-Indian companies using Indian lands 8 
and whether
Indian tribes may bring suit in federal courts to assert their aboriginal title to lands long occupied by states and private persons. ' In the middle of the fray during this formative period, based on his tenure of many years in the Solicitor General's office, Louis Claiborne ventured in 1980 to predict how Indian law would develop in the years ahead. He foresaw three subject areas -as of 1980 -where he believed the principles of Indian law had been essentially established by the Court and would not be changed. These principles were that: (1) tribes have self-governing authority over their members and internal affairs on their reservations and the authority to maintain independent governmental institutions; (2) tribal members on their own reservations are subject to tribal law and will remain free from state regulatory and taxing power; and (3) tribal rights reserved in treaties or by federal common law to natural resources -rights to land, water and to hunt and fish -are firmly anchored and will continue to be protected. One purpose of my presentation in 1991 was to test the accuracy of these three predictions against the Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s. I did this aware that the 1980s had been a period where the Court continued to decide an unusually large number of Indian cases, but where -unlike the 1960s and 1970s" -the majority of the cases in the 1980s were ones that tribal or Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975) ; Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973); Mvlattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973) . The early case of United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) 463 (1984) , holding the boundaries of the Cheyenne River Reservation were not altered by a statute opening reservation lands to homesteaders; Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138 (1984) , and Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877 (1986) , requiring state courts to consider suits brought by tribes as a matter of federal law; County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) , holding tribes have a cause of action under federal law to assert land claim; Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985) , invalidating state tax on tribal oil and gas royalties; National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) , and Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987), requiring exhaustion of tribal court remedies as prerequisite to suit in federal court on matters arising on reservation; California v. Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), holding tribes may operate bingo and card games on reservations without regulation by states; Mississippi Choctaw Tribe v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989) , holding that the Indian Child Welfare Act preempts state authority to order adoption of Indian children domiciled on a reservation, and Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989) , affirmning that tribes hold reserved water rights.
In addition, one can plausibly view Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) -holding that an Act of Congress providing for escheat to tribes of small fractional interest of allotted lands is an unconstitutional taking -is a qualified Indian victory. Also, Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. LaJolla Band, 466 U.S. 765 (1984) , was a partial victory because it sustained the authority of the Interior Department to impose mandatory conditions on federally licensed hydroelectric projects using Indian lands. On the other hand, the Colville case, 447 U.S. at 154-62, was a partial loss since it peritted state taxation of sales by smokeshops to non-Indians and Indians not enrolled in the tribe making the sale. by holding that federal (and implicitly state) courts should abstain even in cases involving reservation affairs where they have concurrent jurisdiction in favor of tribal court adjudication. These decisions indicated that the tribal courts should initially determine the question of whether tribal jurisdiction exists over non-Indians. In addition, in 1979 it was uncertain whether the Court would apply its 1978 decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 5 -which had held that tribes have been implicitly divested on criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians -to preclude exercise of tribal civil regulatory, taxing or adjudication jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservations. The tribal court abstention cases 6 confirmed some degree of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over cases with non-Indian parties. Three other decisions in the 1980s confirmed tribes' power to tax non-Indians entering into business transactions with Indians on trust lands, 7 and one decision confirmed tribal regulatory powers over nonIndians entering trust lands to hunt or fish.
8 It is fair to say that at the end of the 1980s, tribal powers of self-government were if anything more firmly anchored than at the beginning of the decade.
I think the same is true with respect to the principle that reservation Indians are immune from state regulatory control or taxation. The Supreme Court strongly reaffirmed this immunity in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 9 where after setting forth the basic legal structure of prior cases, the Court concluded that "[t]he unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelpful to apply to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes those standards of pre-emption that have emerged in other areas of the law."" Thus, the Court held it was unnecessary to find "an express congressional statement" that a particular state law has been preempted. 2 544, 565 (1981) , readily acknowledged this authority as well on trust lands, but held that tribes had lost the power to regulate non-Indians hunting or fishing on reservation fee lands, except where the non-Indians had entered into consensual relations with the tribe or their activities threatened or directly affected the political integrity, economic security or the health or welfare of the tribe.
19. 448 U. S. 136 (1980 An exceedingly important decision following Bracker-both doctrinally and in terms of its impact on Indian economic development -was California v. Cabazon Band,72 where the Court held that tribes could operate bingo and card games without following state regulatory standards. After Cabazon, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,' establishing standards for conduct of tribal gaming, including casino gaming. In the decade since Cabazon, more than one hundred tribes have established casinos, netting several billion dollars a year in revenues and providing tens of thousands of jobs for Indians and nonIndians. Indeed, many tribes have lifted their entire tribal membership out of poverty.
Equally important from a doctrinal point of view, the Court also invalidated Montana's tax on tribal oil and gas royalties, reaffirming the principles of Bracker, Cabazon and earlier cases that states generally have no regulatory authority over tribes or Indians on reservations unless Congress has expressly authorized that regulation. The Court's decision in Rice v. Rehner9 in 1983 forged a lone exception to this principle where Indian activities on a reservation would cause very unusual and demonstrable harm to non-Indians on or surrounding the reservation and where Congress had generally delegated authority to states over a subject matter that tribes had no tradition of controlling. In Rice, the Court required an Indian selling liquor on a reservation to obtain a state liquor license, reasoning that the on-reservation Indian activity could gravely impact non-Indians and because states had been recognized by Congress and in the Twenty-First Amendment as having important coordinate responsibilities for liquor regulation and control along with the federal govemmOntY
The third area where Louis Claibome predicted that Indian rights would remain secure was in natural resources. Decisions in the 1980s generally 22. Id. 23. Califomia v. Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) . 24. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988 ). 25. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985 . 26. 463 U. S. 713 (1983) . 27. While Rice applies only in "the narrow context of liquor regulation," Rice, 463 U.S. 713 at 722, 733, and the case has not been used in the ensuing 14 years to allow additional state authority over reservation Indians, it remains unfortunate that the Court in Rice crafted an area where states could exercise jurisdiction over Indians at all on a reservation absent specific congressional consent. The Court's decision in Rice is especially puzzling because an act of Congress, 18 U.S.C. § 1161, which allowed liquor sales on reservations so long as they adhered to "state" standards, was apparently read by the Court as furnishing explicit congressional consent to state regulation of tribal liquor sales. If that is a correct construction of the statute, it would have been a sufficient basis standing alone for the decision.
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https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss2/10 SPECIAL FEATURES vindicated that view, although the Court did so at times by the slimmest of majorities. One of the most important Indian cases in the decade was Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida." Oneida -a 5-4 decision -holds that a tribe may sue in federal court to vindicate its aboriginal title -without respect to state law barriers such as statutes of limitation or laches. In the other major resources case of the 1980s, Wyoming v. United States,' an equally divided court affirmed without opinion the continued application of the practicable irrigable acreage standard of Arizona v. California, 3 " leaving the basic doctrine of federal reserved rights unchanged. Both decisions accord with Claibome's general prediction. However, the Court did hold that earlier water rights decrees affecting tribes were binding, even where the tribes had not been adequately represented by the United States.
3 ' And the Court held that federal courts should ordinarily defer to state court jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian water rights so long as the state court also adjudicated all non-Indian rights in a watershed as well' Claibome predicted that the major unsettled Indian law issue to be resolved in the 1980s was tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. Claibome predicted the most favorable outcome Indians could expect -after the Court held in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 33 that tribes had no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians -would be that the Court would sustain tribal authority over non-Indians on trust lands and preclude state authority over non-Indians engaged in commercial or other interactions with Indians on trust lands. He doubted that tribes would be allowed to tax or regulate non-Indians on fee lands. The law developed slightly differently than Claibome had hoped. First, as noted, tribal taxing authority on non-Indian activities on trust lands now appears secure because of four decisions on the 1980s0' However, the Court did not preclude state authority in every circumstance where non-Indians do commerce with tribes or Indians on reservation trust lands. In some of these circumstances, the Court has precluded concurrent state authority, 35 The Court in Bracker employed this "particularized inquiry" test and held the State could not tax a non-Indian timber contractor hauling timber for a tribal enterprise on BIA and tribal roads." The Court emphasized that the State was "unable to identify any regulatory function or service performed by the State that would justify the assessment of taxes for (these) activities."
In virtually all subsequent cases involving state taxes on or regulation of nonIndians doing business with Indians, the Court has used this "particularized inquiry into the nature of the State, Federal and tribal interests at stake... to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law." The outcome of any individual case involving state regulation of non-Indian mineral lessees thus turns on a weighing of those interests. Unfortunately, this is a very fact specific test and it is hard to predict in advance how the Court or lower federal courts will balance the interests in a particular fact situation. The result has been a clash of regulatory schemes and "double taxation" of transactions in some instances, i.e., where the Court allows concurrent taxing authority. This outcome seriously complicates and discourages economic activity in Indian country. At the very least, the balancing test produces uncertainty which encourages litigation between tribes and states. The In my view, the Court was wrong to reject the "bright-line" rule Claiborne advocated that would have prohibited state authority over commerce with Indians on reservations under the Indian Commerce Clause. The Court specifically considered that proposition when it was argued by the Solicitor General in Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue, 8 and rejected it. I think that was unwise, both because it established a murky test with bad results and as a matter of legal analysis. In my view, "commerce with the Indian tribes" is much more closely akin to foreign commerce -where federal authority is exclusive -than to interstate commerce. Under this view, state taxation or regulation of commerce between Indians and non-Indians on reservation trust lands should be precluded unless expressly authorized by Congress. The constitutional inquiry should center around the purpose of each component of the Commerce Clause. The chief purpose of the interstate commerce clause is to require equality in each state's treatment of its own commerce and that of its sister states. A free trade zone is established. Protectionist measures are prohibited. By contrast, the purposes of the Indian commerce clause are different. The very reason for the clause is to protect Indians and Indian commerce. In the vintage case of United States v. Forty Three Gallons of Whiskey,3 the Court so held in contrasting the power of Congress and the states over Indians under the Articles of Confederation and under the Constitution. It observed that in the Articles, "two limitations were placed upon the power of Congress over Indian affairs: the Indians must not be members of any State, nor must Congress do anything to violate or infringe the legislative right of a State within its own limits." The Court concluded that:
[O]f necessity, these limitations rendered the power of no practical value. This was seen by the Convention which framed the Constitution.. . The only efficient way of dealing with the Indian Tribes was to place them under the protection of the General Government. Their peculiar habits and character required this .... Thus, state control over Indian commerce under the Articles was replaced by the Constitution which "provid [ed] 
